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Articles 
DRUG COURIER PROFILES: AN INFRINGEMENT ON FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
by Irene Dey 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Drug courier profiles were developed in the early 
1970s as part of an effort to reduce the flow of drugs 
into the United States. The profiles gained wide use 
by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) at airports 
and, due to their success, gained much popularity with 
state and local law enforcement agencies. Although 
there is no national drug courier profile, each agency 
uses similar characteristics in composing its own 
profile. However, within each profile there are many 
inconsistencies. 
Drug courier profiles have gained much 
popularity since the 1970s and have been used in 
many situations, from airports to interstate roads. 
With the increased use of profiles, many legal issues, 
particularly relating to the Fourth Amendment, have 
arisen. The government's interests in controlling 
crime and public safety need to be weighed against 
the intrusiveness of stops and seizures related to drug 
courier profiles, as well as the potential for prejudice 
as a result of the widespread use of race and gender 
as components of the profiles. 
II. HISTORY 
Since 1974, the DEA has assigned highly skilled 
agents to major airports as part of a nationwide 
program to intercept drug couriers.1 The Drug Courier 
Profile guides agents in identifying characteristics that 
experience has shown to be relevant in identifying 
suspects.2 The DEA claims that when agents first 
started this detail at the airport they did not know 
exactly what they were looking for, since the majority 
of cases involved information from law enforcement 
agencies or airline personnel. 3 As time went on, the 
DEA began to see a pattem in the characteristics, and 
agents began using these patterns to pick out 
individuals suspected to be narcotic couriers.4 
In the first few months of the program at Detroit 
Metropolitan Airport, seventy-seven searches out of 
1 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 508, n.2 (1983) (citing United States v. 
Mendenhall,446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980». 
2 See Royer, 460 U.S. 491. See also infra text accompanying notes 25-29. 
3 Id. at 525. 
4 Seeid. (citing United States v. McLain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 
1977». 
ninety-six encounters turned up drugs.5 Out of 141 
people searched, 122 people were arrested.S DEA 
agents working at New York's LaGuardia airport 
estimated that approximately 60% of the people who 
fit the drug courier profile characteristics were found to 
be carrying drugs.7 The success of DEA drug courier 
profiling prompted many state and local law 
enforcement agencies to give their officers training in 
this area.s However, drug courier profiles have not 
been determined to provide any set mathematical 
formula for establishing grounds for a belief that 
criminal activity is afoot.9 A court might conclude that, 
simply because these characteristics are contained in 
a "profile", they should not be given any more or less 
weight in determining whether an officer's suspicion is 
well founded. 10 
III. WHAT IS A DRUG COURIER PROFILE? . 
Although there is no single "national" profile, drug 
courier profiles for each law enforcement office are all 
very similar.11 Drug courier profiles describe 
S See id. (citing United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. 
Mich. 1976 ), atrd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1011, 98 S. Ct. 722, 54 L. Ed. 754 (1980». 
6 Mendenhal, 446 U.S. at 562 (citing Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. at 539). After 
the first 18 months of the program, agents searched 141 people in 96 
separate encounters, arresting 122 people and finding substances in 96 of 
the encounters. Two of the agents in this program arrested Mendenhall. 
7 Royer, 460 U.S. at 525 (citing United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501, 
n.8 (2d Cir. 1979». 
8 Seeid. 
9 See id. However, the use of drug courier profiles has played an important 
role in a number of lower court decisions such as: United States v. Forero-
Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980); ; United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429 
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 923,101 S.C!. 1374,67 L.Ed.2d 352 (1981); United States 
v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 
(2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Vasquez, 612 F .2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 447 U.S. 007,100 S.Ct. 2991,64 L.Ed.2d 857 (1980); United States 
v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 
882 (6th Cir. 1978); Unfted States v. Scott, 545 F .2d 38 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.C!. 796, 50 L.Ed.2d 784 (1977); United States 
v. Diaz, 503 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1974). 
10 See id. (stating that each case will tum on its own facts, the existence of 
characteristics repeatedly found in drug smugglers in each particular case 
is to be considered accordingly when determining if there are grounds to 
believe further investigation is appropriate.) 
11 Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Propriety of Stop and Search By Law 
Enforcement Officers Based Solely on Drug Courier Profile, 37 ALR 5th 1, 
8 (1996)[hereinafter Winbush article). 
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characteristics generally associated with narcotics 
traffickers.12 These traits may mean nothing to the 
untrained eye, but to law enforcement officers with 
special training they may lead officers to believe a 
suspect is involved in drug trafficking. 13 These traits 
supposedly are ones that "normal travelers" do not 
exhibit14 and, which experience has shown, allow 
officers to identify as relevant. 15 
A. Components/Characteristics 
Common elements of many drug courier profiles 
include: twenty to thirty-five years of age, travel to or 
from a drug source or destination city,16 numerous 
previous trips to those cities, remaining at the 
destination city for a short period of time, making 
reservations just prior to flight departure time, non-
stop flights,17 paying in cash,18 false call back number 
given to airline,19 travels alone, travels early in the 
morning when law enforcement is more lax, deplanes 
among first or last passengers, exhibits nervous 
behavior, walks hurriedly through the terminal, scans 
others in the airport "as if doing counterveillance," 
makes a phone call soon after deplaning, wears 
flashy, baggy, or expensive clothing, carries little or no 
luggage, luggage has no identification on it, uses 
public transportation, and race.2° These factors are 
thought to assist law enforcement officials in curbing 
the actions of drug traffickers. 
B. Inconsistencies 
There are many inconsistencies among drug 
courier profiles. As previously indicated, the suspect 
being first to deplane,21 as opposed to the suspect 
12 Seeid. 
13 See/d. 
14 Royer, 460 U.S. at 525, n.6. 
uSee id. at 491 , n.2. 
16 Drug source cities or destinations originally included Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, 
New York City, Los Angeles, and Detroit. Now, basically any large city can 
be considered a drug source city. 
17 Recently, changing flights has also been used as part of a drug courier 
profile. See infra, note 20. 
18 Usually in bills of small denominations. See Winbush article, supra note 
12. 
19 This may also include a number that is not registered in the persons name, 
but may be the actual residence where the traveler resides. See United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
20 See Winbush article, supra note 12. 
21 United States v Moore, 675 F.2d 802,803 (6th Cir. 1982). cert. denied, 
460 U.S. 1068 (1983). 
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being the last to deplane is a key element. 22 However, 
individuals deplaning at a time somewhere in between 
have also been used in drug courier profiles.23 Some 
drug courier profiles include the purchase of one-way 
tickets,24 round-trip tickets,25 nonstop flights,26 and/or 
changing planes?7 Carrying no lugga~e, new 
sUitcases,29 carrying a gym bag,o traveling alone! 
and traveling with a companion32 have also been cited 
as components of some drug courier profiles. 
Furthermore, suspects who act too calm33 or too 
nervous34 may fall within the parameters of some drug 
courier profiles. 
Some inconsistencies allow officers to make 
determinations, such that the outcome will place the 
suspect under scrutiny, no matter which way the 
pendulum swings. Inconsistencies are not rare; in 
fact, they are present in almost every drug courier 
profile.35 This "chameleon-like way of adapting to any 
particular set of observations"36 enhances the risk of 
reflexive reliance on a profile of drug courier 
characteristics.37 
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Drug courier profile stops have been determined 
to be "seizures" for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.38 The Fourth Amendment guarantees 
22 MendenhaO, 446 U.S. 544. 
2J United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1980). 
24 United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1980). 
2S United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d. 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977). 
26 United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977). 
27 United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated, 
831 F.2d 1413 (1987). 
28 Craemer, 555 F.2d at 595. 
29 SulUvan, 625 F.2d 594. 
30 United states v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 991 (1982) .. 
31 United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 (6th Cir. 1978). 
32 United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218,1219 (5th Cir. 1980). 
33 United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F .2d 991, 992 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). 
34 United States v. Andrews, 600 F .2d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 1979). 
3S See supra notes 22 - 35 and accompanying text. 
36 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11(citing 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(Marshall J. dissenting». 
37 See id. 
38 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440, 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980). There are 
three basic categories of encounters with police. The first is the encounter 
where the indMdual is free to leave and not answer the officer's questions. 
This type of encounter is not a seizure for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. MendenhaO, 446 U.S. 544. The second encounter is the 
protection to each citizen from unreasonable searches 
and seizures and applies to each state through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 39 Fourth Amendment 
analysis often tums on the warrant clause, which 
requires a warrant to be issued prior to a search or 
seizure, provided there is probable cause.40 The 
United States Supreme Court has held that a search 
or seizure is unreasonable if not supported by 
probable cause.41 Even though the amendment itself 
does not give a remedy for those whose rights have 
been violated,42 the Supreme Court has attempted to 
preserve the integrity of the Fourth Amendment by 
excluding from trial all evidence obtained from an 
illegal search and seizure.43 Searches and seizures 
that do not meet the Fourth Amendment's warrant or 
probable cause requirements may still be 
constitutionally permissible in some instances, 
however.44 Presently, there is "no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing 
the need to search (or seize) against the invasion 
which the search (or seizure) entails.,,45 When a court 
"stop· where the individual does not feel free to leave, which is a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) 
(revising the standard of what is considered a "stop"). The third encounter 
is that where the individual is "arrested", or placed in the officer's custody. 
The arrest is also a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491 (stating that behavior matching the "so-called drug courier profile" is 
enough to establish reasonable suspicion for a detainment). 
39 See Ker v. Califomia, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963). 
40 U.S. Constitution, Amend. IV; see a/so United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 
573,577 (1971); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,100 (1959). Both 
cases noted that probable cause is necessary to support a search warrant. 
41 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (stating that the 
amendment deems the search or seizure reasonable if all of the requirements 
are satisfied). 
42 See infra note 53. 
43 Hall, supra note 2, at 1012 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
which held that the exclusionary rule is a "deterrent safeguard without 
insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to 
'a form of words'"). See a/so WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1 (3d ed.), § 1.1, at 3-20 (2d ed. 
1987). 
44 Arrests can be made without a warrant where probable cause exists or 
when exigent circumstances exist, such as the probability of evidence being 
destroyed or danger to the officer. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 
796 (1984); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Vale v. 
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
45 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see a/so See v. 
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The Court has applied this test often 
to analyze Fourth Amendment issues. E.g. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325,340-341 (1985) (stating when a warrant needed to be obtained); INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041-1050 (1984) (stating when the 
exclusionary rule should apply); Hudson v. Palmer,468 U.S. 517, 525-36 
(1984) (defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. 
Martlnez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976) (defining the necessary 
amount of suspicion for searches and seizures). 
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finds that the government's interest outweighs the 
relative intrusiveness of the search or seizure, 
generally the search and seizure are considered 
reasonable, satisfying the Fourth Amendment.46 
In the landmark decision of Terry v. Ohio,47 the 
Supreme Court extended the balancing test. In Terry, 
a police officer had been patrolling in downtown 
Cleveland when he observed two men standing on a 
corner that "didn't look right.,,48 The officer believed 
the men were "casing a job" and approached them. 
Suspecting that the men were armed, the officer 
grabbed Terry, patted him down and recovered a 
pistol.49 The Court was faced with a situation in 
which a police officer had briefly detained and 
searched an individual without probable cause, also 
known as a "stop and frisk."50 The Court applied the 
balancing test to this "stop and frisk," and decided that 
the search and seizure were reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. 51 
To determine whether the "stop and frisk" was 
reasonable, the Court first examined what government 
interests would be furthered by these actions.52 The 
Court ultimately decided a stop and frisk could be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as 
an officer's ability to stop and search people without 
probable cause is restricted. 53 In the Terry 
decision, the Court created the "reasonable suspicion 
standard," which involved a two part test. 54 The first 
part of the test restricts "stops" where no probable 
cause exists to situations where "reasonable, 
articulable suspicion exists that criminal activity is 
afoot. ,,55 However, the Court stated that an officer's 
good faith belief, or "hunCh," that the individual was 
acting suspiciously would not be enough to be 
46 Hall, supra note 2, at 1012. See a/so Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. 
47 Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See a/so Hall, supra note 2, at 1012. 
48 See infra note 58; see a/so Hall, supra note 2, at 1012. 
49 Terry, 392 U.S. 1. 
50 Seeid. 
51 See id. at 21. 
52 See id. at 22. (noting that the governmental interests in "effective crime 
prevention and detection" were furthered by allowing an officer to approach 
people for the purposes of investigation without probable cause for arrest). 
53 See id. at 27. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 20. The Court emphasized that when making this 
assessment, it is crucial that the facts the officer bases his conclusions on 
are objective in nature. (stating "would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in 
the belief that the action taken was appropriate?"). Stops have also been 
restricted by the Court by requiring the stop to be less than a formal arrest. 
Dunawayv. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
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considered reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 56 The second part of the Terry test 
placed limitations on the "frisk" resulting from the 
"stop. 1157 The Court stated that the frisk should be 
limited to situations where it was necessary58 and 
should be bound by the same factors that traditionally 
limit all searches.59 Application of these balancing test 
restrictions demonstrates that the government's 
interests in Terry outweighed the intrusiveness of the 
procedure, and therefore the procedure was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.so Similar 
analysis is used by the Supreme Court for drug courier 
profile cases. 
V. COURTS'APPROACHES 
Courts differ in their approaches to the question 
of whether drug courier profiles prove the requisite 
reasonable suspicion that is necessary for a Terry 
stop,61 as well as determining when a seizure has 
occurred to trigger the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.52 If a court determines that a seizure 
occurred at the time when an officer stops an 
individual, then the suspect's later comments and 
behavior should be irrelevant in determining whether 
there was any adequate reasonable suspicion for the 
investigative detention.53 However, the suspicion of a 
suspect is significantly lessened when a suspect's 
match to a number of drug courier profile factors do 
not coincide with other more suspicious aspects of the 
profile.54 
VI. OTHER TYPES OF PROFILES 
Courts have previously approved the use of other 
types of profiles. Some examples include: airline 
~ See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); see also LAFAVE, supra note 45, 
at § 9.3(b). 
57/d. 
sa Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. The Court specifically stated that the frisk should 
be limited to situations where the frisk was necessary to protect the officer 
and others close by. The Court has not allowed the frisk to be used to 
investigate crime or to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence. 
See also Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). 
~ The traditional factors are purpose, character and extent. See Terry, 392 
U.S. at 25. 
60 This procedure is now known as a "Terry Stop· and has been ratified by 
the Supreme Court. See LAFAVE, supra note 45, at § 9.2. 
61 Winbush article, supra note 12, at 8. 
62 Seeid. 
63 Seeid. 
64 See id. For examples of the different approaches, see Ornelas v. United 
States, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996); Royer, 460 U.S. 491. 
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"hijacker" profiles,65 battering parent profiles, 66 gang 
member profiles,67 auto theft profM!s, trucker 
profiles,69 drug package profiles,70 marijuana grower 
profiles,71 alien smuggler profiles~ and alimentary 
65 United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 1989). 
66 Hoosier v. State, 612 So.2d 1352 (AI. Crim. App. 1992). 
67 United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1989). 
68 State v. Ochoa, 544 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. 1976). 
69 Dee Wampler & Joseph Passanise, The Increasing Use of Promes and 
Prescribed Tactics in Drug Prosecutions, 51 J. Mo. B. 288 (1995) 
(stating that cases are being litigated as to the use of this 
profile being used by state highway patrol agencies and 
weight inspectors due to the increased use of 18 wheelers 
to transport large quantities of drugs across the nation. 
Some elements of this profile include: improper bills of 
lading, previously unheard of trucking company, trucks not 
fully or properly licensed, unusual load being hauled on a 
long bip, supposedly pulling trailer with a sealed load but the 
lock has been tampered with, nervousness of driver, and 
unable to verify cargo or purpose of trip with the "home 
office" ofthe company.). 
70 Id. (stating that the U.S. Postal service and DEA have developed this 
profile to stop dug trafficking through the mail. Elements of this profile 
include: size and shape of package, package heavily taped to close and seal 
all openings, handwritten labels, unusual return names and addresses, 
unusual odors coming from the package, fictitious return addresses, 
destination of parcel, multiple packages sent to same address but to different 
persons, retum address does not exist, numerous packages mailed to arrive 
for delivery on a repeated basis). The courts have determined that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in our personal effects must give way to 
society's interest in law enforcement to win the war on drugs. See United 
States v. Terpak, 666 F. Supp. 1424 (D.C. Haw. 1987). 
71 See Wampler & Passanise, supra note 72 (stating that Missouri has been 
a leading state in the adoption of this profile to support issuance of a search 
warrant. The profile includes the following: occupants of house subscribe to 
HIGH TIMES magazine, indoor gardening equipment from companies that 
advertise in HIGH TIMES, outbuildings have electrical lines connected to the 
house, utility company records reveal unusually high wattage in past months 
compared to neighbors, surveillance does not indicate any large machinery 
that might use an increased amount of electriCity, whether suspects failed to 
complain to utility company about previous excessive bills, suspects have a 
criminal record, suspects have large dogs, may be receiving shipments of 
hydroponic growing equipment and purchasing other marijuana growing 
equipment, receive mail, especially boxes under a fictitious name, known to 
be unemployed, officers hear humming sounds consistent with use of a 
ballast used to power halide lights, excessive roof top air conditioners or 
vents used to ventilate, blanket covered windows, infrared sensing devices 
measure surface waste heat emanating from the house, suspicious people 
visiting at all times during the day and night, people visit for only a few 
minutes duration.) See, e.g., State v. Miller, 815 S.w.2d 28 (E.D. Mo. 1991); 
United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993). 
72 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. 873 (1975) (invoiving a random 
roving border patrol stop). See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 
(1981) (stating that the border control officer had a "particularized suspicion· 
based upon the totality of the circumstances that satisfied the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard). 
canal smuggler profiles.73 The Terry analysis of 
reasonable suspicion, based on articulable and 
specific facts, underlies courts' reasoning in all profile 
cases?4 These decisions are not necessarily indicative 
of courts' acceptance of profiles, but do demonstrate 
a willingness to cumulate the specific facts, which 
alone are sufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion 
requirement. 
VII. GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS VS. FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
The government has two important interests 
when it comes to stops based on less than probable 
cause: effectively detecting and preventing crime and 
ensuring public safety.75 
A. Crime Control 
The two main objectives of using drug courier 
profiles for controlling crime are the interception of 
drugs at their point of entry,16 and the disruption of the 
transportation networks of major drug trafficking 
organizations.77 The interception of drugs at their 
point of entry, thus keeping them out of the hands of 
the users and off the streets, is the primary goal of the 
govemment's "war on drugs.,,78 By stopping the drugs 
before they are distributed, the government saves 
itself time and money by affecting one seizure rather 
than stopping many individuals for smaller amounts of 
drugs.79 
Although drug courier profiles are helpful in the 
7) United Statesv. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (stating that 
·under this standard officials at the border must have a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the particular person of alimentary canal 
smuggling"). 
74 Alec Farmer, Note, Criminal Procedure-"Drug Courier" Characteristics 
are Sufficient to Establsh Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Conduct, 12 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 407, 413 (1990). 
7S Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (recognizing the governmental interest in 
effectively patrolling the U.S.lMexican border); Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (1967) 
(stating that 'stop and frisk" is justified as promoting "effective crime 
prevention and detection"); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272,1275 
(5th Cir. 1973)(stating that it suffices to say that there is a judicially-
recognized necessity to insure that the potential harms of air piracy are 
foiled"). 
76 See Alexandra Coulter, Drug Couriers and the Fourth Amendment: 
Vanishing Privacy Rights for Commercial Passengers, 43 VAND. L. REV. 
1311,1313 n.8 (1990). 
77 See Bob Sablatura, The Border War: Major Traffickers Evade High-Tech 
Drug War, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 17, 1992, at A1. (stating that 'he end result 
of successful drug interception operation is often the discovery of a load of 
marijuana taken out of the smuggling pipeline before it reaches the street.") 




prevention of drug smuggling, the interest of the 
govemment in using drug courier profiles to disrupt the 
transportation networks of major drug trafficking 
organizations is ill founded because the profiles have 
no major effect on disrupting drug networks.so The 
drug courier profiles are generally used to stop the 
transporters of the drugs who are usually expendable, 
"low-ranking members" of the drug organizations.81 
B. Public Safety 
Both the Terry line and profile cases state that 
the heart of the govemmental interest lies elsewhere 
and must include the safety of the public and law 
enforcement officials.82 However, effective law 
enforcement and protection of the public alone is not 
enough to support searches and seizures where there 
is no probable cause.83 Even though drug courier 
profiles are helpful in preventing many of the dangers 
that drugs pose to society at large, they do not 
necessarily prevent any violence at airports or on our 
highways.B4 The dangers presented to society by drug 
couriers are not being alleviated through the use of 
profiles.85 Unless profiles are determined to be less 
intrusive than govemmental interests, drug courier 
profiles cannot be upheld by the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness clause. 
C. Intrusiveness 
Stops and searches based on less than probable 
cause have been found to be very intrusive.86 
Because of the "chameleon-like" way that profiles 
conform to a variety of innocent behavior, profile use 
provides law enforcement officers the subjective right 
to stop and detain hurried travelers simply for 
80 Seeid. 
81 Seeid. 
82 See id. See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 23; United States v. Lopez, 328 F. 
Supp. 10n, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating that "where the risks of hijacking 
to passengers and Cff!!W and to the viability of the entire industry are so great 
we cannot say on balance that the use of the FAA system is imprudent."); 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (noting that a government 
interest in the safety of officer's executing a search warrant is of high 
importance). 
83 Hall, supra note 2, at 1027. 
84 Id. at 1028 (noting that the Supreme Court has relied upon this concem 
in other cases, upholding government-mandated drug testing schemes that 
did not require individualized reasonable suspicion, thus allowing for less 
intrusive means for increasing airport security). 
8S Seeid. 
86 Id. at 1029. See also Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275 (noting that being 
subjected to the FAA hijacking program is "inconvenient and annoying, in 
some cases it may be embarrassing, and at times it can be incriminating"). 
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displaying innocent behavior.s7 Although law 
enforcement officers are well trained and have 
extensive experience, they do not have the discretion 
to select neutral human behavior as the justification for 
the formation of probable cause.88 Profiles allow 
officers to infringe upon a citizen's Fourth Amendment 
rights to be free from an unreasonable search and 
seizure in situations where officers observe nothing 
that would remotely indicate an involvement in the 
transportation of illegal drugs.89 These are situations 
in which an officer sees neutral human behavior--
behavior which an educated or experienced officer 
may testify would give rise to a reasonable and 
permissible inference that criminal activity was afoot. 90 
The common theme in federal and state cases 
discussing intrusions into personal liberties is that the 
decisions seek to preserve those liberties unless there 
is a demonstrated public interest concem that must 
override the protections guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the United States, particularly the Bill of 
Rights. Increasing pressure on the courts and public 
officials to provide the tools necessary in waging an 
effective battle on the "war against drugs" is resulting 
in incoherent jurisprudence of Fourth Amendment 
principles at a time when both law enforcement and 
citizens need clearly defined substantive guidelines. 
The only effective way to do this is to layout uniform 
standards of an objective nature--in essence, taking 
the power out of the police's hands and giving the 
courts something to review. At present, it is the officer 
and his own experiences that determine what 
characteristics are common in drug couriers, and 
which characteristics warrant a stop when there is less 
than probable cause. To rectify this, courts need to 
apply the Terry balancing test and delineate an 
objective test that officers can easily apply in the field, 
while still maintaining individual rights. 
D. Prejudice 
Race and gender are two of the most "innocent" 
87 United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J. 
dissenting). See aIsD United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1209 (1983) (citing a 1983 O'Hare Airport 
statistic where 70% of all stops that were made pursuant to a drug courier 
profile did not reveal drug trafficking, subjecting between 4 to 9 innocent 
people per day to unnecessary police scrutiny). 
88 LAFAVE, supra note 45, at §3.6 (f) (2d ed. 1987); see also People v. 
Reynolds, 445 N.E.2d 766 (111.1983); Donaldson v. State, 46 Md. App. 520, 
420 A.2d 281 (1980). 
89 See Whitehead v. State, 116 Md. App. 497, 504-05, 698 A.2d 1115 
(1997). 
90 Seeid. 
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characteristics that are included in some drug courier 
profiles.91 The use of these characteristics however, 
only increases the intrusiveness of the profiles. 
Although profiles are not committed to writing, most 
clearly contain a racial component.92 Whether 
conscious or unconscious, the decision to stop a 
suspect based on race will rarely ever be admitted to. 
The state of the profiles as they exist now allows 
officers to stop suspects based on the "totality of the 
circumstances" as well as the officer's own 
experiences.93 If, in the officer's experience, drug 
couriers are of a certain ethnicity or racial background, 
that would be a sufficient component for the stop, yet 
this is strictly prohibited by the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
In allowing the use of race in investigatory stops 
and in failing to discourage or condemn this practice, 
many courts have accepted such raCially based 
doctrines, also known as the "out of place doctrine" or 
"random" investigatory stops, as important predictive 
devices.94 So much latitude and acceptance of 
subjective judgments of officers makes it easy for 
officers to deny the use of race and easily point to 
other factors that may have contributed to their 
suspicions. 
A prime example of race playing a factor in 
motorist stops is the case of Wilkins v. Maryland State 
Police. 95 Mr. Wilkins was a graduate of Harvard Law 
School and was a staff attomey at the Public Defender 
Service for the District of Columbia.96 He was a 33 
year old black male, married, and drove a 1989 Nissan 
Sentra.97 Mr. Wilkins dressed conservatively, wore 
hom rimmed glasses, and was "very articulate."98 
Mr. Wilkins quite clearly does not fit the typical 
drug courier profile. However, on May 8, 1992, while 
driving a rented Cadillac from Chicago to Washington, 
D.C. with his aunt, uncle and cousin after his 
grandfather's funeral, the car was stopped by 
91 See United States v. Rosales, 60 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished 
opinion); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 392-93 (8th Cir. 1992). 
92 See Sheri L. Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 
YALE L.J. 214, 234 (1983). 
93 Seeid. 
94 See Erika L. Johnson, A Menace to Society: The Use of Criminal 
Proffles and its Effects on Black Males, 30 How. L.J. 629 (1995). 
9S The Wilkins case was settled with approval from the U.S. District Court 
of Maryland on January 5, 1995. 
96 See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
425,438(1997). 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 438-39. 
Maryland State Police TrooperV.W. Hughes on 1-68 in 
Cumberland, Maryland.99 Mr. Wilkins's cousin was 
driving when the officer pulled them over at 5:55 a.m. 
for speeding. 1OO Trooper Hughes stated that the car 
had been traveling 60 m.p.h. in a 40 m.p.h. zone and 
immediately produced a request for consent to search 
the vehicle, even before issuing a citation or 
waming.101 At the time the car was pulled over, it was 
raining outside, and Mr. Wilkins's uncle refused to 
consent to a search of the vehicle. 102 Mr. Wilkins 
inquired as to why the officer desired to search the 
car, and Trooper Hughes refused to give a reason, 
merely repeating his request to search the car, saying 
something about "problems with rental cars coming up 
and down the highway with drugS."103 Mr. Wilkins 
explained that they were retuming from his 
grandfather's funeral, and offered to show the officer 
the obituary, which the officer refused. 104 Trooper 
Hughes informed the family that if they did not consent 
to a search of the car, they would have to wait while a 
drug sniffing dog was brought out to inspect the car. 105 
Mr. Wilkins, being a criminal defense attorney, 
informed the officer of the law preventing him from 
detaining the family without a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that they were carrying drugS. 106 The officer, 
somewhat irritated, informed the family that they would 
have to wait, and at approximately 6:25 a.m. Sergeant 
Brown arrived with a narcotics dog and ordered the 
family out of the car. 107 The family requested to 
remain in the car during the dog's inspection of the car 
to avoid having to stand in the rain, the officers 
refused, and the dog slowly and thoroughly sniffed the 
car, detecting nothing. 108 A speeding ticket was 
issued at approximately 6:35 a.m., and the Wilkins 
family continued their trip home. 109 
As any person would be, Mr. Wilkins and his 
family were humiliated and upset. 110 Mr. Wilkins 
decided to pursue a legal course of action, and wrote 
to the American Civil Uberties Union (ACLU), who 




10l See id. 
104 See id. 
10' See id. 
106 See id. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683, 689 (1985). 
107 See id. 
lOS See Id. at 439 - 440. 
109 See Id. at 440. 
110 See Id. 
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chose to represent Mr. Wilkins after an initial 
meeting.111 Attorneys from the firm of Hogan & 
Hartson agreed to join the ACLU as counsel for Mr. 
Wilkins, and a lawsuit was filed against the Maryland 
State Police.112 Mr. Wilkins and the ACLU alleged that 
the Wilkins family had been falsely imprisoned, and 
were intentionally treated differently on account of their 
race, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
and Maryland Common Law. 113 The Plaintiffs also 
claimed a deprivation of "their right to equal protection 
of the laws as enjoyed by similarly situated Caucasian 
citizens of the United States secured to them by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."114 
The parties entered into a settlement agreement 
on January 5, 1995 which involved monetary damages 
and injunctive relief.115 The Maryland State Police 
denied using race in motorist stops, but agreed to 
explicitly prohibit such discrimination in the future, 
conduct officer training, and maintain computer 
records tracking motorist detentions and searches to 
enable the agency, the court and the Plaintiffs to 
monitor compliance. 116 The computer records were to 
document the date, time, and location of the consent; 
search and/or dog sniff; the grounds for the search 
and/or dog sniff; the name of the officer; the race of 
the person(s) stopped, detained or searched; and the 
year, make, and model of the car.117 The agreement 
also included a clause that allowed the Plaintiffs to 
require the Defendants to provide additional identifying 
information in the computer records if the Plaintiffs 
could make a reasonable showing that a pattem and 
practice of race-based stops existed. 118 
Data covering the first twenty-one months of the 
monitoring period (January 1995 - September 1996) 
was filed with the court and supplied to the 
III See id. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. See also Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, Complaint filed in U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maryland, p. 12. 
II' See /d. See a/so Settlement Agreement, United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland, Civil Action No. MJG-93-468. 
116 See Davis, supra note 99, at 440. See a/so Settlement Agreement, at p. 
3-5; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Enforcement of 
Settlement Agreement and for Further Relief, Civil Action No. CCB-93-468, 
p.1-2. 
117 See id. at 440-41. See a/so Settlement Agreement, supra note 118, at 
5. 
118 See id. at 441. 
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Plaintiffs. 119 The data showed a disturbing pattern of 
continuing racial discrepancies, which was a violation 
of the non-discrimination policy and the settlement 
agreement. 120 The Plaintiffs appealed to the court 
which found the Maryland State Police in contempt 
and imposed an additional civil contempt monetary 
penalty, payable to the court. 121 In addition, the 
Plaintiffs requested that: (1) the Maryland State Police 
provide the Plaintiffs with names, addressees, and 
telephone numbers for all motorists searched along 
the 1-95 corridor since January 1995; (2) Maryland 
State Police record-keeping obligations be extended 
by one year, until December 1998, and be expanded 
to include motorist stops in addition to motorist 
searches and detentions; and (3) Maryland State 
Police produce all investigative and disciplinary 
records reflecting any actions taken by the agency to 
enforce the policy of non-discrimination established 
under the settlement. 122 
The data submitted by the Maryland State Police 
was collected, organized and analyzed by Mr. Wilkins 
and the ACLU. 123 This data showed that more than 
one-third of all Maryland State Police drug interdiction 
activities involving motorists occurred along 1-95, north 
of Baltimore.124 The Maryland State Police drug 
interdiction team, the "Special Traffic Interdiction 
Force" (STIF), is a specialized team of troopers trained 
and solely focused on drug interdiction activity along 
1_95.125 The data for this area of the Maryland State 
Police records was glaring,126 so Plaintiffs focused 
their monitoring on this 1-95 corridor. 127 
The data was measured by two separate 
methods, one being a benchmark of percentages of 
African-American and other minority motorists 
traveling and violating traffic laws along the 1-95 
119 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Enforcement of 





123 See id. at 3. 
124 From January 1995 through September 1996, Maryland State Police 
troopers reported a total of 2, 372 motorist detentions and searches through 
the state. Of these searches, 823 (34.7%) occurred north of Baltimore, in 
Harford, Cecil, and Baltimore Counties, along 1-95, according to Maryland 
State POlice records. 
m See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Enforcement of 
Settlement Agreement and for Further Relief, Civil Action No. CCB-93-468, 
3n.2. 
126 See id. at 4-8. 
127 Seeid. 
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corridor, the other being a racial breakdown for 
Maryland State Police searches conducted on 1-95 as 
compared with those for searches conducted by the 
Maryland State Police on roadways other than 1_95.128 
Both measures resulted in evidence that the racial 
disparities were extraordinary, showing a racially-
based pattem and practice. 129 
Statistical analysis was also performed on the 
data. The analysis showed that only about one in 
every six 1-95 motorists and three out of every four 
motorists searched by state police were African-
American. 130 The Maryland State Police contended 
that this was a mere coincidence. 131 However, the 
statistical analysis shows that the odds that three-
quarters of Maryland State Police detainees would be 
African-American by mere coincidence are about one 
in a quintillion.132 
This racial distortion is unnecessary to 
successful drug interdiction; even Maryland State 
Police data demonstrated this.133 Comparisons of the 
1-95 corridor stops with the stops on other roadways in 
Maryland revealed that troopers patrolling 1-95 search 
black motorists at a rate that is more than double the 
rate of the troopers who patrol elsewhere in 
Maryland. 134 Yet the rates of motorists discovered 
with contraband by troopers are very similar on and off 
the 1-95 corridor.135 More significantly, Maryland State 
Police data showed that police find contraband on 
black and white motorists at equal rates statewide.136 
As a result of this dramatic showing of race-
based stops prevalent in Maryland, on April 11, 1997, 
Judge Catherine C. Blake ordered that the police 
continue to record identifying data of all people who 
have been stopped for traffic violations along 1_95.137 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The governmental interests in interdicting drugs 
do not allow for delaying motorists in situations where 
no reasonable articulable suspicion of drug trafficking 
128 See id. at 5. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 8. 
131 Seeid. 
IJ2 See id. at 9. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
I37See Catherine M. Brennan, Coutt CaBs for Closer Look at Police Records, 
DAILY REC., Monday, April 14, 1997 p. 1. 
exists. A traffic stop cannot become a convenient 
occasion for an officer to delay the travels of the 
ordinary motorist so that the officer may dispel a mere 
hunch that the motorist has committed a past or 
present crime. 138 Though the public has a compelling 
interest in detecting drug couriers and even though 
there are few problems that may cause citizens 
greater concem, the sweeping approach to law 
enforcement by officers makes it necessary that courts 
set constitutional, objective guidelines. 
While we may expect and hope that law 
enforcement officers will exercise their powers with 
discretion and while we may encourage and applaud 
them in their extraordinary efforts to combat the 
increasing drug problems in this country, giving them 
free reign to do so leaves all of us at risk of being 
violated. Those law abiding members of society who 
have done no wrong should not be subject to searches 
and seizures by officers who, but for no other reason 
than a hunch based on a drug courier profile, 
suspected criminal activity. 
Allowing profiles that include a racial component 
runs afoul of the law. Race-based drug courier 
profiles rely on a fallacy, particularly that drug 
1385ee United States v. Walker, 941 F.2d 1086, 1088-90 (10th Cir. 1991), 
reh'g denied, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1093, 112 S. Ct. 1168, 117 L. Ed. 414 
(1992). 
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trafficking can be predicted by the race of a person, 
resulting in the stereotype that African-American 
people or people of other minority races are drug 
dealers. This is clear1y a violation of the United States 
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Regardless of 
claims by law enforcement and other governmental 
agencies, that profiles do not rely on race, but rather 
"reasonable suspicion," the data is clear--the stops are 
not coincidental. 
The use of drug courier profiles is not without 
benefit. However, without an objective way to guide 
police officers, the court is sure to lose its ability to 
rule on the stops and seizures of citizens where drug 
courier profiles are used. In order to be effective, drug 
courier profiles must be combined into one rationally 
based national profile. Rather than basing its 
decisions on the reasonableness standard, courts 
need to weigh the governmental interest in protecting 
the public in its ''war on drugs" against the 
intrusiveness of these profiles for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. Once this has been effectively 
accomplished, drug courier profiles will become less 
subjective, and more likely to have a positive impact 
on the drug problem in the United States. 
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